Maintaining Nuclear Stability in South Asia by Neil Joeck

Author:Neil Joeck [Joeck, Neil]
Language: eng
Format: epub
Tags: History, Military, General, Strategy, Political Science, International Relations, Arms Control, Political Freedom
ISBN: 9781136045769
Google: zTraAAAAQBAJ
Publisher: Routledge
Published: 2013-09-13T15:57:59+00:00

Nuclear Planning: Doctrine, Response and Warning

If, as Munir Khan and Arunachalam imply, Pakistan and India maintain peacetime control of nuclear weapons by keeping components separated and/or away from delivery vehicles, unauthorized use is unlikely. It is not clear, however, at which point or under what conditions authorized use would be allowed. The decision to retain nuclear capabilities implies that a decision may have to be taken authorising or foregoing use. Decision-makers in New Delhi and Islamabad should not be lulled into thinking that minimum deterrence is sufficient to prevent this situation from arising. Even stable minimum deterrence would not prevent crises and possibly conflict; thinking about nuclear planning sooner rather than later will increase the likelihood that reason rather than panic dictates the outcome of a nuclear confrontation. Both countries must address issues such as doctrine, alternative response options, alerts, early warning and intelligence.

India and Pakistan have apparently made no major effort to adapt their strategic policies to the acquisition of nuclear capabilities.13 Analysts in both countries maintain that neither side is irrational enough to use nuclear weapons, but this is no substitute for integrating political interests with the military means to defend them.14 Nuclear weapons are seen – even by South Asia's nuclear proponents – to have only political value, but if they are treated as little more than symbols they will not only fail to prevent war, they will also make it more costly. Professor Barry Posen notes that because resources are scarce, ‘the most appropriate military means should be selected to achieve the political ends in view’.15

However, the connection between nuclear weapons in India and Pakistan and specific political objectives in the event of war is unclear. It is not clear whether either country has decided on the size and mix of its stockpile, but relatively small numbers of weapons may establish boundaries on strategic doctrine. Low numbers of weapons make an extended nuclear war unlikely as both countries would have to assume that some weapons might fail, some delivery vehicles might not reach their destination and some targets might be missed. With small numbers, Pakistan could not expect to achieve victory with nuclear weapons alone, and a portion of the stockpile would need to be retained to terminate the war on favourable grounds.

Even after a nuclear exchange, leaders on both sides would want to terminate the conflict without further nuclear use. Intra-war deterrence is difficult to calculate as much would depend on the damage done, the disposition of forces in the field, the involvement of third-party intermediaries and other, unforeseen, factors. Neither side may therefore be able to use many nuclear weapons in a conflict. An alternative strategy may be to brandish the weapons by conducting a nuclear demonstration, but, depending on the conduct of the war, this may serve only to deplete the stockpile while escalating tensions.

Given the inherent limits on the use of nuclear weapons, it would help if India and Pakistan considered how they might be used to achieve political objectives before a crisis forced the issue.

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